Between 2015 and 2022, the sector expanded rapidly. Platforms competed aggressively for projects, capital was abundant, interest rates were near zero and real-estate valuations rose steadily across Europe. In that environment, high-yield offers—often promising 8% to 18% annual returns—appeared deceptively stable. That cycle has ended.

A Market That Shrunk Overnight Since 2023, several prominent platforms have withdrawn from the market or significantly scaled back operations, including EUv Digital Invest, MaxCrowdFund, EstateGuru (in parts of Europe), and ReCrowd. At the same time, others are fighting to stabilize their business models amid rising defaults and refinancing stress. Platforms such as Dagobertinvest, Exporo, Kapitaal Op Maat, Rockets Investment, OneCrowd and Crowdrealestate continue to operate—often under stricter underwriting standards and with more conservative deal selection. The shift has been abrupt. Rising interest rates, higher construction costs, tightening bank financing, the economic fallout of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have all converged. Projects that were viable under 1% financing costs became unworkable at 6% or 7%. Refinancing dried up. Liquidity vanished. The Core Misunderstanding: Yield Equals Risk Much of the investor backlash stems from a fundamental misconception. Crowd-investment platforms operate in the grey capital market—a space that sits between regulated bank products and private equity. These are risk-capital investments, not savings products. Every investor signs documentation acknowledging the possibility of partial or total loss. High returns are not a gift; they are compensation for risk. An 8% to 18% coupon is not comparable to a bank deposit, a government bond or a capital-protected product. It reflects exposure to development risk, market risk, refinancing risk and, in many cases, subordinated capital structures. When defaults occur, they are not evidence of fraud by default—often they are the mathematical outcome of leverage meeting a macroeconomic shock. Platforms, Promoters and Responsibility That does not absolve platforms of responsibility. During the boom years, competition for deal flow led some platforms to relax underwriting standards, rely on optimistic exit assumptions or concentrate exposure geographically or by sponsor. But the narrative that platforms or entrepreneurs are inherently deceptive ignores a critical reality: many risks cannot be controlled once capital is deployed. Interest rates, geopolitics, inflation and banking policy sit far outside the influence of a project sponsor or platform operator. Importantly, the sector has evolved. Several platforms now emphasize bank-like collateral structures, including first-ranking mortgages, personal guarantees, pledge agreements and stricter loan-to-value ratios. These measures do not eliminate risk—but they do improve recovery prospects and transparency. A Viable Model—If Treated Correctly The crowd-investment model itself is not broken. It fills a structural financing gap left by traditional banks and allows private investors access to opportunities once reserved for institutions. But it only works under one condition: clear understanding and honest pricing of risk. Investors seeking safety should not chase double-digit yields. Those who accept volatility and potential loss may still find the asset class attractive—provided diversification, due diligence and realistic expectations are applied. The past year marks not the end of European real-estate crowd investing, but its transition from exuberance to maturity. The question for investors is no longer whether returns are high—but whether they understand why they are.